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ABSTRACT
Amnesties are widely used in society to rehabilitatepast sinners, to
collect resources, such as library books, that would otherwisebe
unrecoverable, and to make enforcement easier by reducing the ranks of
delinquents. Over the past four years, tax amnesties haveemerged as a major
instrument of state revenue policy. Twenty states conductedamnesties.
Record collections were made by New York ($360million) and Illinois (income
tax amnesty dollars 3.4% of collections). Amnesties took indollars that
would probably have escaped otherwise, and tax rollswere bolstered. Tax
amnesties also have costs, however. Theymay anger honest taxpayers, diminish
the legitimacy of the tax system by pardoningpast evasion, and decrease
compliance by making future amnesties seem more likely.
Should the federal government, aswirl in tax reformandsuffering from an
estimated $100 billion tax evasion problem, now offeran amnesty of its own?
What type of federal program would most likely be offered?What would it be
likely to accomplish? State tax amnesties have generally beencoupled with
enhanced enforcement efforts, a feature intended topreserve the legitimacy of
the tax system. The amnesty/enforcement combination twists thepenalty
schedule, lowering it now raising it later, in thatway encouraging prompt
payment. With no past sins to hide, future compliance also becomes less
costly, hence more probable. Any federal amnesty, we predict, would be
accompanied by a strengthening of enforcement. After reviewing the state
experience, we speculatively estimate that a federal amnesty/enforcement
program might collect $10 billion initially and yield a continuing increment
to annual revenues on the order of $10 billion.
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Massachusetts raised $85 million through a tax amnesty program; New York
collected more than four times that amount.In California, Illinois, Alabama,
Arizona, Wisconsin, and twelve other states, people and corporations willingly
stood in line for hours to pay the taxes they owed while delinquency penalties
were temporarily suspended, to deliver bills and checks and coins to state
treasuries. Many were choosing to make a first appearance on the tax rolls.
Tax amnesties have raised hundreds of millions of dollars that revenue
collectors would otherwise have found difficult or impossible to capture.
Amnesties have swelled the rolls of paid—up taxpayers and increased the
population of regular filers. State revenue department estimates suggest that
a well-publicized amnesty combined with stricter future enforcement
considerably increases the level of future voluntary compliance with tax laws.
Amnesties may have had some less positive effects as well. They may have
angered law-abiding taxpayers who dislike seeing tax breaks given to abusers
of the system. Current amnesties may have encouraged some citizens to believe
that there will be future amnesties as well, reducing their incentives to keep
current on their payments. Not surprisingly, considerable controversy has
arisen over whether (and how) tax policy should make use of amnesty programs.
In practice, tax amnesties have been coupled with enhanced enforcement
efforts, a feature that seems essential to preserve the legitimacy of the tax—2—
code. (Moreover, given some factions' opposition to any reductions of
penalties, the promise of more vigorous enforcement is probablynecessary to
win political approval of an amnesty program.) An amnesty and enforcement
program twists the schedule of expected tax penalties, lowering them
temporarily but raising them later, thus providing a strong incentive for
offenders to come forward. An important further effect is to make future
compliance more attractive. Citizens who have past delinquencies to conceal
may hesitate to file an accurate current return lest it raise questions about
previous years. But once the slate has been wiped clean under an amnesty
program, their cost of future compliance is reduced.
Should the federal government follow the example of the states and offer
a tax amnesty of its own? Today, when unprecedented federal budget deficits
have reached 5 percent of gross national product (GNP), andmany believe that
tax evasion is costing the government as much as $100 billion ayear, this
question seems increasingly worthy of attention. Barring massive increases in
enforcement expenditures, an amnesty might be the onlyway to bring many
evaders back into compliance. Congress's recent approval of asweeping tax
reform, designed in part to restore legitimacy to the tax code, provides an
opportune time to consider a federal tax amnesty coupled with more vigorous
enforcement to capitalize on and help mark a new regime.
Some observers have argued that the decision whether to offeran amnesty
should be based on a fairly mechanical weighing of additional taxcollections
to be achieved now against possible losses later. Such anapproach, which in
effect considers an amnesty program purely as arevenue-raising device, would
be most appropriate if the program could be expected to raisea significant—3—
fraction of tax revenues, say 3 or 4 percent of total collections.Existing
estimates, none of which claims to be more than speculation, are less
optimistic. Allen H. Lerman, of the Office of Tax Analysis, U.S. Department
of Treasury, suggests that an amnesty might raise $1 billion (notincluding
revenue due to greater future enforcement). Our assessment suggests that a
combined amnesty/enforcement program --whichpolitical forces may make an
inevitable coupling --couldraise as much as $10 billion over the status quo,
but even that sum would be only about 1.5 percent of revenues.To judge the
virtues of an amnesty, policy makers will have to weigh the revenues raised
against its other consequences, both positive and negative, whichmay be
substantial. For example, some elements of a tax amnesty willsupport, and
other elements will undermine, the legitimacy of the taxsystem, and therefore
the revenues that it collects. Given the salience of taxes in the citizen's
interactions with the government, a tax amnesty may also affect the perceived
overall legitimacy of government.
Many state amnesties have been accompanied by a significant strengthening
of enforcement efforts. The revenues thus generated must be viewedas a
product of the joint instrument. How then should we assess the efficacy of a
prospective federal amnesty? Should we consider merely the effects of adding
an amnesty, leaving present enforcement efforts unchanged? Or should we
compare the status quo with an amnesty program that also includes a stepped-up
enforcement program? Or should we assume a strict enforcementprogram and see
what an amnesty adds?
In our view, an amnesty is a political instrument ——acompromising
counterbalance that helps lead to stricter enforcement efforts.(Indeed,—4—
Congress may never find time for a consequential discussion of enforcement
except in the context of debate over a federal amnesty.) Thus a federal
amnesty, together with the enforcement efforts likely to accompany it, should
be judged against the realistic alternative, the enforcement expected without
an amnesty. Moreover, to assess the full effects of an amnesty on revenue, we
must consider the future impact of the accompanying enforcement changes. The
experience of the states, as we shall see below, suggests that enhanced future-
revenues exceed the direct revenues of the amnesty itself. Any revenue
projections must remain highly speculative, however, making it all the more
important to examine the other consequences of a potential amnesty.
1.When Do We Give Amnesty?
To help focus our thoughts about tax amnesties, we believe it is useful
to consider the justifications for other kinds of amnesty. When have
societies given amnesties? What characteristics do amnesties share? What
purposes are they alleged to serve, and what do they actually accomplish?
When are they socially productive? Having explored these issues, we shall
return to the special case of tax amnesties.
Amnesties are not unusual. In the past two decades, governments in the
United States have given amnesties for draft evasion, parking tickets,
unreturned library books, and now tax evasion. Perhaps the most significant
amnesty was signed into law this fall; it offers permanent residence status to
an estimated 4 million illegal aliens who entered the United States before
January 1982. In conjunction with the amnesty, substantial penalties will be—5—
imposed on employers of ineligible and future illegal aliens, with a promised
increase in enforcement efforts. This amnesty eases the transition to a new
regime, in part by exempting old offenders, whose sheer numbers would make
strict enforcement impossible. It also reflects a political compromise
between defenders of present illegal residents (amnesty supporters) and the
interests seeking to stem the illegal tide, who gain significant sanctions for
new offenses.
It is common -—thoughnot universal ——forthe winners of a war to
provide some form of amnesty for those who honestly supported and honorably
defended the losing side. Many societies give continuing amnesties for some
offenses. Statutes of limitations erase liability for torts, for prosecution
for misdemeanors and most felonies (but not federal tax fraud!); large library
fines are often imposed, but seem almost never to be collected. Some
amnesties are formal and require an application process and documentation;
others are unadvertised.1For example, most revenue collectors waive
some penalties for taxpayers who claim administrative error as a cause of
their noncompliance with tax laws and who voluntarily appear to pay the tax
and any interest due.
Other social conventions akin to amnesty are also common. The
enforcement of some laws is so casual as to constitute a practical amnesty.
Drivers in large packs of automobiles traveling a few miles per hour over the
speed limit are virtually immune from speeding tickets; citizens are so
unlikely to be penalized for keeping small amounts of marijuana for private
use in their homes that society might as well have declared an amnesty;
ancient laws about sexual practices are routinely ignored and largely—6—
unenforced. Lax enforcement sometimes reflects simple priority setting. Some
laws are viewed as obsolete, given changing social norms, and we naturally
direct scarce enforcement resources toward more important offenses. But other
choices are unrelated to the seriousness of the crimes. Low-level street -
crimein some communities enjoys something like continuing amnesty because
jails are overcrowded; enforcement authorities, aware that penalties are being
waived for most convictions, direct their attention and arrests toward
offenders who can successfully compete for space in jail.
For many violations, however, societies never give amnesties, and
virtually never even give pardons. For heinous crimes, major frauds like
embezzlement, or desertion from a combat unit under fire, no serious
consideration is given to blanket abatements of penalties (though in carefully
reviewed cases with extenuating circumstances, an individual offender may be
shown leniency).
In what circumstances are amnesties particularly likely? First,
societies generally give amnesties for offenses committed by a relatively
large number of otherwise reasonably ordinary citizens, whose allegiance and
noncriminal reputations we wish to maintain or reclaim. A classic example is
draft evasion in a war that is unpopular or widely perceived as unjust. Many
young men evaded the draft in the Vietnam era. Though by no means a random
sample of draft—age citizens, they were not significantly set apart from other
citizens except as a result of evading the draft. Similarly, people withmany
parking tickets are difficult to distinguish from the rest of us.2 When a law
is sufficiently flouted, it becomes illegitimate. In some cases, we modify
the law. But when, as with taxes and illegal aliens, changing the law is—7.-
particularly undesirable --weneed government revenues and we will not throw
open our doors to immigrants --amnestymay provide a way to recapture
legitimacy.
Second, societies are more likely to give amnesties foran offense that
did not directly damage an identifiedparty. Contrast draft evasion with
desertion under tire. Draft evasion certainly affectsother people -—someone
else will be forced to serve --butit is hard to know exactly whom.3
Desertion from a combat unit under fire, in sharpcontrast, directly endangers
the lives of an identified group of individuals, and istherefore harder to
forgive.
Third, we are more likely to declare an amnesty for a violationthat is
unrelated to other offenses. Society is more likely toprovide amnesty for
private home use of small amounts of marijuana than for assault,theft, or
burglary. Smoking marijuana at home ——atleast under current social mores
——isnot a very strong indication of sociopathic behavior.Being involved in
street crime is more strongly linked to a patternsociety wants to discourage.
Fourth, amnesties seem to be more likely when society will find it
difficult to enforce the penalty anyway. Forgivinglibrary fines is a good
way to recover books, particularly when the alternative is to have neither the
books nor the fines. Proponents of amnesty for illegal aliensargue that it
would be too costly and too painful to find and deport the multitudewho
established residence in the United States someyears ago, and that society
might as well declare this reality to be in conformance with the law.Society
gains by eliminating the deadweight loss (of books not available at the
library and of residents who must avoid contact with public agencies) andby—8—
bringing the violators into conformance with social norms when there is little
to gain by keeping them estranged.
2.Benefits and Costs of Amnesties
What do societies seek to gain by offering amnesties? Commonly, there
are seven main benefits. First, an amnesty may enable us to collect some
proportion of past debts that otherwise would be uncollectable. In 1983, for
example, Philadelphia collected over 160,000 volumes during its highly
publicized one-week library amnesty --booksthat would otherwise have been lost
to its system. (That event apparently provoked much mutual congratulation and
removed a load of guilt from 35,000 patrons, whom the library praised as
showing "great respect for reading and libraries.") Parking and tax amnesties
do not eliminate the original charges, just the supplementary penalties. In
effect delinquents are offered a chance to clear the slate by paying some of
what they owe. Illegal aliens eligible for permanent residence under our new
legislation will be allowed eighteen months to get on the books, become
taxpayers, and so on. Failing this, they will be liable to expulsion.
Second, amnesties encourage renewed compliance. After a parking amnesty,
people may take more care to park legally. This benefit is particularly large
when, in the absence of an amnesty, there is a strong incentive for
delinquents to remain so. A draft evader who wanted to return from Canada and
go straight in 1972 no longer faced Vietnam but Leavenworth. Tax evaders, to
hide past delinquency, often must continue to cheat. A bank cannot advance
further credit to a corporation (or country) in default, even if the new loan—9—
is expected to be profitable.4 Amnesties allow society torearrange
incentives that otherwise favor continued noncompliance on thepart of a
delinquent.
Third, giving an amnesty often makes the society better able to control
the future. The conquering army that offers amnesty to its vanquished
opponents if they surrender their arms --andthreatens powerful action
against those who do not cooperate by a given date --notonly begins to heal
society's wounds but dramatically reduces the potential for future armed
conflict. (The military analogy seems appropriate in judging the taxamnesty
of our home state of Massachusetts.) Parking ticket amnesties result ina
current address list useful in future collection efforts, thus making future
compliance more likely. An amnesty for toxic waste dumps might permit society
to find out where they are before poisons filter into groundwater. And a tax
amnesty makes future adherence to the tax code more likely, by removing the
need to conceal past sins. An amnesty is desirable if it lowers the cost of
behaving well in the future.
Fourth, amnesties allow society to forgive violators who are unlikely to
become repeat offenders, penitents, individuals who have become delinquent by
blunder, or offenders who have transgressed some rule society regards as
minor. Some violations may have sprung from well-intentioned behavior. For
example, many of those who evaded the Vietnam dratt did so out of honest
disagreement with their government; they can claim a loyalty to principles
that society strongly supports. Although society cannot affirm their decision
to evade, it may want to mitigate the penalty; amnesty after the war provides
one avenue.-10—
Fifth, amnesties help to reduce or eliminate deadweight burdens from a
social schism or from individual guilt. The threat of punishment may deter an
offense, but once deterrence has failed, the continuing guilt or ostracism
serves little purpose. Punishment may deter future offenses, but it cannot
change what is already done. Once the desire for retribution or revenge has
been long enough served, the time may come to bury the hatchet to reduce the
implied waste.
Sixth, amnesties may permit society to declare that it made a mistake and
now wants to change its mind. Some believe that the Vietnam draft amnesty is
at least ambiguous in this respect ——and,therefore, perhaps particularly
dangerous. Establishing that society can change its mind may make many kinds
of socially undesirable behavior more attractive, undercutting social norms.
Some observers might interpret an amnesty for past marijuana offenses as a
sign that an amnesty for cocaine will eventually be offered.5
Finally, amnesties can make the transition to a new enforcement regime
seem more fair. When society systematically fails to enforce a law over a
long period, it implicitly creates a presumption that the offense is not
serious, encouraging otherwise honorable members of society to choose
noncompliance. Surveys suggest that as many as one-third of Americans think
that tax cheating can be condoned. Under such circumstances, it may seem
unfair to change the degree of enforcement, subjecting those who offended
under a known lax enforcement regime to penalties consistent with a harsher
view of the offense.6
Even for offenses regarded as serious, a long—standing failure to
identify and punish perpetrators may reduce the legitimacy of a later roundup.—11.—
Aswe debate how to improve enforcement of immigration laws --sendingthe
message that illegal residence (or employing illegal aliens) is a serious
offense --wealso consider amnesty for those who have been in residence long
enough. After so many years of ineffective action, it seems unfair to enforce
the law on those individuals now. Due process requires fair warning.7 And
for those who object that amnesty reduces the legitimacy of the original
system, the promise of stricter enforcement in the future may be an adequate
compensation. Both softies and disciplinarians may prefer a system with
reduced penalties now and stiffer penalties later to the status quo.
Amnesties clearly have costs as well as benefits. First, they often
annoy nondelinquents. One of the present authors usually obeys speed limits
and thinks speeders should be ticketed; the other would like to drive faster
and feels like a chump because those who are driving faster are not being
arrested. Neither of us particularly likes the quasi-amnesty we observe.
Second, amnesties may have undesirable incentive effects. Will those
subject to the next military conscription remember that Vietnam draft evaders
were eventually given amnesty? Will that knowledge inappropriately tilt their
choices in a socially undesirable direction? Why pay parking tickets now if
there will be an amnesty later? Why return any library book now if you can
keep it free until the next amnesty?
To minimize these incentive effects, many amnesties are declared to be on
a "one-time-only" basis. If an amnesty is believed to be truly unique, it
affects only past actions, which cannot be changed, and should have no impact
on future decisions. But it may be hard to make a firm commitment never to
have another amnesty. If it made sense once, why will it not make sense-12—
again? Moreover, many amnesties are clearly foreseeable. The United States
has given amnesties for draft evasion after each war; library amnesties are
given with regularity.8 In these instances, the bad incentive effects of an
amnesty were evidently thought to be outweighed by the benefits of drawing
society back together.9
Amnesties have another potentially critical disadvantage: they
undermine the strength of the social sanction against the amnestied behavior,
reducing the guilt felt by delinquents when they misbehave. Guilt, or its
cousin shame, is a highly efficient tool for social control. It is imposed
automatically, with certainty, for any misbehavior by anyone with a
conscience. And it works. Most people have many chances to steal with
virtually no chance of being caught, yet few do so. Societies therefore
expend great effort to instill the values that create conscience.
Even vigorous enforcement efforts can detect only a small fraction of
offenders. If we must rely on citizens' desire to avoid imposed penalties
(rather than shared values) to ensure compliance with the law, penalties must
be large enough to balance out the low probability of apprehension. In fact,
we may be reluctant actually to impose such severe punishment.1°
As guilt ——or,to put it positively, the warm feeling that comes from
being diligent and honest -—diminishesas a force in the compliance decision,
society must rely on the considerably more expensive and less efficient
approach of identifying and punishing delinquents--both tasks that must be
conducted under strict rules protecting citizens' (and convicts') rights. If
amnesties significantly reduce the guilt associated with future noncompliance,
they may be a bad bargain indeed.11—13—
3. Benefits and Costs of Tax Amnesties
In several respects, tax evasion is the kind of offense for which amnesty
is relatively likely --orat least plausible. No doubt some people became
tax delinquents by mistake and would now like to become honest citizens but
are deterred by the expense or embarrassment. A significant proportion of
taxes is evaded --nearly20 percent at the federal level, it is estimated.
lax evasion by one person does not directly harm other identifiable
individuals. Most past tax evasion will be difficult to detect if it has not
already been identified, so a tax amnesty is making official what is highly
probable anyway.
Moreover, tax amnesties may provide the benefits often sought from
amnesties in other areas. They reduce guilt of evaders (many of them
otherwise ordinary citizens) ——adeadweight loss that hurts them without
helping anyone else. They provide direct benefits in the form of voluntary
back tax payments. They help to reduce future noncompliance by adding former
delinquents to the tax rolls and removing the danger that past malfeasance
will be revealed. And, perhaps most important, amnesties smooth the
transition to a new harsher regime of tax law enforcement with fair warning.
But tax amnesties may also share the disadvantages of other amnesty
programs. Ordinary citizens who have been paying their taxes may feel
unjustly treated either because they are denied vengeance or because they are
made to feel like chumps. Moreover, depending on the form of amnesty granted
and the perceived likelihood of repetition, tax amnesties might encourage
evasion, allowing delinquents to hope they may later be able to reconsider-14—
freely.
Many amnesties relate to single or sporadic offenses, such as a student
occupation of a college building, the possession of handguns when they are
declared illegal, or draft evasion during the Vietnam War. Our tax program,
by contrast, will continue indefinitely, and chiselers and cheaters will
always be among us.In this respect tax amnesties resemble programs offering
permanent residence status for long-time illegal aliens or parking ticket
amnesties. The amnesty must be viewed in terms of long-term objectives of
securing future compliance --forexample, deterring new illegal aliens by
making them unemployable. That is why tax amnesties, and our nation's new
immigration amnesty,are linked with stiff enforcement programs for the
future. We are trying not only to bring past violators back into the fold as
full—fledged citizens (a principal objective of the Vietnam draft amnesty),
but also to prevent strays in the future.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, amnesty for tax evasion may make
cheating seem less significant, reducing the guilt felt by those who consider
stretching their deductions or underreporting their income. A substantial
fraction of taxpayers may behave honestly because they (probably incorrectly)
believe cheating is likely to be detected, but many others probably comply
because they believe it is the right thing to do.'2 If amnesties make
evasion seem forgivable and thus insignificant, they may have serious
financial consequences in reducing voluntary compliance over the long run. In
addition to equity losses, this will mean higher and therefore less efficient
tax rates.
The continuing nature of our tax collection system is a critical feature—15—
distinguishing tax amnesty from, for example, a draft-evadersamnesty for a
particular war (which merely reduces penalties). A taxamnesty is almost
inevitably coupled with increased penalties and enforcement efforts. The
penalty schedule is twisted ——notnecessarily lowered,If strong sanctions
are prerequisites for maintenance of guilt and conscience (andpossible
ostracism for offenders), then a tax amnesty couldactually be part of a
guilt—strengthening effort.
4.Tax Amnesty in Practice: The Massachusetts Experience
Nineteen states have conducted explicit tax amnesties in the lastthree
years, collecting about $1 billion in what they consider otherwise largely
uncollectible taxes from over 500,000 taxpayers. Three statesare currently
in the midst of amnesty periods; two others have legislativeauthorization to
begin amnesties soon. The programs have generally involved forgiveness of
criminal and civil penalties for those who came forward to declaretheir
delinquency and pay the tax they owed, together with a (possibly substantial)
interest charge for the "loan" they had obtained by notpaying earlier. Those
whom the state has already informed of a suspected delinquencyare often
excluded or given only partial amnesty.
The highly publicized Massachusetts program, which becamesomething of an
archetype, ran from October 11, 1983, to January 17, 1984. Its avowedpurpose
was to collect revenue immediately, to permit transition to a new regime of
considerably tougher enforcement, and to increase voluntary compliance in the
future by getting current delinquents onto the tax rolls andencouraging them—16—
to stay there. The program was, on its own terms, wildly successful. Even
the most optimistic forecasters within the Department of Revenue had guessed
that the immediate payments from amnestied taxpayers would not exceed $20
million. When the dust settled and the 52,000 amnesty applications were
tallied, the state had collected $85 million, at a cost of only $2 million for
extra staff and other direct program expenditures. Amnesty payments were
received for every major tax the state imposes, though delinquencies related
to personal and corporate income taxes generated well over half of the
payments. Over 60 percent of the payments were from taxpayers who had not
previously filed any information about the tax they came forward to pay.
Among income tax delinquents, about half of the delinquencies were for a
single year, but over 20 percent were for four. years or more.
The Massachusetts amnesty was combined with a heightened emphasis on
enforcement. The amnesty period was preceded by a series of dramatic
enforcement actions, including highly publicized seizures of assets from
taxpayers the state claimed were delinquent. New legislation (which included
the authorization for amnesty) had recently stiffened the penalties for
evasion, permitted felony prosecution for some particularly flagrant evaders,
allowed the Commonwealth to revoke the licenses of or cancel contracts with
delinquents, and provided additional staff and enforcement resources
(including new funds for computers to track delinquents more reliably).
In this context, which presumably heightened the anxiety of delinquents,
the temporary amnesty period, announced with only one day of public warning,
was presented as a never-to-be-repeated chance to get on the right side of the
law. The enforcement agencies had been displaying their new, sharper teeth.—17—
Many Massachusetts tax delinquents probably had believed that the Commonwealth
would never get serious about tracking them down andcollecting unpaid taxes
and penalties. Now suddenly things looked different. Assetswere seized,
restaurants closed, hotels shut down. Tax evaders faced felonyprosecution,
and it seemed as if some would actually go to jail. Asurprising number of
delinquents seized the opportunity offered by amnesty topay up and stop
worrying about how much bite might be behind the bark.
But the direct payments made under the amnesty program wereonly one
class of benefit. The program also played an important rolehelping
Massachusetts move to a new period of stiffer enforcement withoutseeming to
break an implicit contract with taxpayers about how much enforcementscrutiny
there would be. Since concentrating the new enforcementresources on prior
delinquents was likely to be procedurally difficult and conceivably toappear
unjust, and since only a small percentage of past delinquents was likely to be
discovered, there was little reason to try to clear out the inventory of
delinquents through direct enforcement. Why not declare an amnesty and let
them pay up on their own, particularly since this approach wouldprobably
yield more money?13 An individual who failed to come forward despite the
amnesty program would then seem fairer game for a stern penalty program.
Using an amnesty to smooth the rough edge of the transition also struck a
useful political compromise between self-avowed softies and hard-liners.
The new enforcement regime is expected to have two major benefits;
(1) the state may be able to increase its collections from future delinquents
substantially; (2) future voluntary compliance with the tax code may be
increased. Massachusetts has estimated both of these effects and claims they-18—
are large in comparison with the direct returns of amnesty. According to
Department of Revenue figures, audit assessments pursuant to the new
enforcement efforts in fiscal years 1983 through 1985 exceeded those of the
prior three—year period by $263 million. Total collections of delinquent
taxes (excluding receipts under amnesty) were up $130 million over the same
period. And, from a comparison of econometric estimates of tax revenues
(based on preamnesty behavior) with actual collections in fiscal years 1984
and 1985, the Commonwealth estimates that improvements in voluntary compliance
have resulted in $480 million in extra tax payments across the two-year period
(excluding the direct collections from amnesty).14
Since it is impossible to know exactly what level of tax payments would
have prevailed in the absence of tougher enforcement and amnesty, these
estimates must be viewed with caution. They do suggest, however, that the
continuing payoffs from more vigorous enforcement -—greaterdelinquent tax
collection and more voluntary compliance --substantiallyexceed the direct
revenues from the amnesty.
A few figures will put the gains from amnesty in perspective.
Massachusetts' revenues in fiscal year 1984 were $5.8 billion. Direct amnesty
revenues (from an expressly one—time initiative) were $85 million, or 1.5
percent of annual revenues. A generous estimate would put the measurable
impact of the amnesty and enforcement program at roughly $400 million per
year, or about a 6 percent increase in annual revenues. If there is greater
voluntary compliance now, there will be less delinquent tax to find and assess
later, which suggests that straight extrapolations based on short-term state
experiences would be generous indeed. But even if we cut these figures by—19—
two-thirds and consider a 2 percent increase in thepermanent level of annual
revenues, the impact is still far more important than a one—time collection of
1 or 2 percent of revenues. The revenue effectiveness of anamnesty and
enforcement initiative depends primarily on the extent to which it shifts
collections permanently upward, not how much it yields on a one-time basis.
5. The Effects of State Tax Amnesties
The roots of state tax amnesty programs are obscure. Illinoissponsored
a small program in 1982, raising less than $100,000 in amnesty collections.
Large-scale programs began in 1983, when four states ran official taxamnesty
programs. Of these, only Arizona collected more than $1 million or more than
0.05 percent of state tax revenues; its collections were nearly 0.3percent of
state tax revenues for the year. Seven states fieldedprograms in 1984 --
programsstraddling year-end are classified under their concluding year —-
collectingover $250 million in total, with two states (Massachusetts and
Illinois) collecting 1.5 percent or more of state tax collections in thatyear
through amnesty payments. The following year saw a large program in
California, which raised nearly $150 million, about 0.5 percent of tax
revenue. Several smaller states had moderate-sized amnesty programs. There
has been strong continuing interest in 1986, with New York collecting $360
million and Michigan $103 million (about 1.7 percent and 1.1 percent of annual
revenues, respectively). Table 1 summarizes the states' experience, showing
the level of direct tax amnesty collections both in dollars and as a fraction
of state tax revenues.—20—
Have amnesty programs affected compliance? Any analysis must deal with
worlds that never existed, since there is no control group of states that have
significantly bolstered enforcement without offering amnesty, or offered
amnesties without an increase in stringency. Thus we have no way to know
whether the Massachusetts program of tougher enforcement would have been
socially palatable and politically feasible, and worked equally as well, in
the absence of an amnesty. We can, however, observe the growth of state tax
revenues in states with and without amnesties. Table 2 shows the difference
between the annual growth rate of tax revenues in states with tax amnesties in
1984 and 1985 and in states that had no tax amnesty. As the first column
indicates, tax revenues grew more slowly from 1980 to 1983 in states that
later had tax amnesties than in states that did not.15 If all states that had
tax amnesties in 1984 and 1985 are included, their tax revenues grew about one
percentage point slower than other states in the period from 1980 to 1983.
But from 1983 to 1985, when we would expect to see the effects of their tax
amnesties, these states' revenues grew faster than those of the other states,
by approximately one-half percentage point. Thus, relative to states without
amnesties, the annual growth rate of tax revenues in amnesty states shifted up
by about one and one-half percentage points during the period in which the
amnesties operated.(If the amnesty monies were nonrecurring, states running
successful amnesties in 1984 would show no exceptional increase in growth
rates from 1983 to 1985.)
These results become stronger if we focus on states with particularly
large tax amnesty programs. As Table 2 indicates, in states with amnesties
collecting over 0.3 percent of state tax revenues, the annual growth rate of—21—
tax revenues shifted up by 3.5 percentage points as compared with nonamnesty
states during the period of the amnesties, with slightly larger shifts if the
threshold is raised to 0.5 percent or to 1 percent of tax revenues.
Looking solely at states with amnesties in 1984 provides some evidence
that the revenue growth effect persists beyond the year in which amnesty
operates. Table 3 shows the tax revenue growth rates between 1982 and 1965
for 1984 amnesty states; for the subset of 1984 amnesty states with amnesty
collections of more than 0.3 percent of 1984 tax revenue; and for other
states.In the period before amnesty took effect (1982 to 1983), tax revenues
in the 1984 amnesty states grew more slowly than in other states, by three to
four percentage points. During the actual operation of the amnesty (1983 to
1984), their revenues grew at a rate closer to that of the other states, but
still about two percentage points lower. During the postamnesty period (1984
to 1985), their revenues grew faster than in other states, by one to two
percentage points. The shift is more dramatic for states with larger tax
amnesties (as measured by the fraction of state tax revenues collected through
amnesty payments), presumably because of greater earlier noncompliance or more
vigorous gains in enforcement. These results are only suggestive,
particularly because fiscal years and calendar years do not match in most
states, and in some cases amnesty revenue may be split across two tax years.
Nevertheless, these figures suggest that the revenue growth associated with
amnesty and its accompanying enforcement persists beyond the period in which
amnesty is declared.
There are many differences between the economies and tax systems of
amnesty and nonamnesty states, which may explain some of the observed shift in—22—
tax revenue growth rates. These results must therefore be viewed with
caution. Still, it is striking that in the period before they declared their
amnesties, the tax revenues of amnesty states were growing more slowly than
the national average; after tax amnesty, their revenues grew faster than the
national average. If amnesty, with an associated greater enforcement effort,
is not the explanation, it is at least strongly correlated with whatever the
deeper explanation might be. For states that later had amnesty collections of
over 0.3 percent of tax revenues, annual growth in tax revenues in the period
before amnesty was about two-thirds of the national average; after amnesty, it
was slightly above the national average. (Background figures for these
calculations are not presented in the tables.) This is quite a substantial
shift; even if it does not persist beyond these two years, it would lift tax
revenues -in these states by 2 to 10 percent above what would have been
expected on the basis of the preamnesty period.
How much additional revenue flowed from these states' amnesty and
enforcement programs? To provide a crude measure, we projected what tax
revenues in 1984 and 1985 amnesty states might have been in the absence of
amnesties if the difference from the national average in their revenue growth
rates before amnesty had persisted in 1984 and 1985.16 While the
projections for each state are subject to considerable variation, the
aggregate estimates provide a speculative basis for assessing the total
revenue gain associated with tax amnesty programs.
Using this approach, we estimate aggregate gains between $3 billion and
$5 billion over the 1984—85 period in the tax amnesty states.17 Their
actual revenues in that period were about $120 billion, so the extra revenues—23—
apparently associated with their amnesty programs are about 3 to 5 percent of
the revenues collected.18
6.Toward a Federal Tax Amnesty Revenue Estimate
The apparent success of state tax amnesty programs, together with
historic federal budget deficits, has prompted a variety ofproposals for a
tax amnesty program at the federal level. Governors of states with successful
experiences have pushed the idea. It has been proposed in various forms in
Congress. The President has expressed interest. The commissioner of the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has adamantly resisted suggestions topursue
the idea, but proponents press on. The sweeping tax reformpackage, recently
signed into law, represents a change in regimes that provides a perfect
occasion for amnesty, and its phasing provides a rather broad window of
opportunity. A program combining amnesty and stricter subsequent enforcement
would be expected to increase voluntary tax compliance. Deficits would be
reduced, not by forcibly taxing away hard—earned dollars from reluctant
taxpayers, but through voluntary contributions from taxpayers happy to have an
opportunity to come clean and go straight. So argue the proponents of a
federal tax amnesty.
Can the state experience help us understand what might happen under a
federal amnesty? There are difficult hurdles to overcome in applying lessons
from the state to the federal level. Knowledgeable commentators have taken
several tacks. Allen Lerman of Treasury's Office of Tax Analysis has argued
that analysis should be limited to amnesty by itself, not amnesty in—24—
conjunction with an increase in enforcement effort.19 There are two reasons
to adopt this focus. First, it is a relevant question in itself ——wemay
well wish to know the independent effect of amnesty, not just the effect of
amnesty combined with additional enforcement effort, because we, can (and do)
operate the two policies separately. Second, we may regard the federal
enforcement effort as already adequate, or in any case unlikely to be changed.
If so, we again want to focus on amnesty by itself.
Lerman estimates that the one-time revenue gains from federal amnesty per
se, net of costs and net of revenues actually captured by enforcement efforts
rather than amnesty, would be about $1 billion. He takes several different
approaches to the estimate, obtaining roughly the same answer each time.
We might, alternatively, try to estimate what a greater enforcement
effort would bring in by itself. Many have argued that since federal tax
enforcement is better than most states', state amnesty/enforcement packages
shed little light on what might be achieved at the federal level. The IRS and
analysts at the Office of Management and Budget (0MB) have developed estimates
showing how much additional revenue might be collected through enhanced
federal enforcement effort.2° These estimates suggest that both the average
and the marginal yield from enforcement spending is dramatically greater than
$1 per dollar spent, and often greater than $10 per dollar spent. Thus
greater enforcement efforts at the federal level should yield substantial
revenues. Moreover, these estimates systematically understate the
productivity of more enforcement activity, since they exclude the (possibly
quite substantial) impact on voluntary compliance. This suggests that there
is good reason and ample room for sharpening the tax collector's teeth, even—25—
at the federal level.21 If an amnesty would help us to move to more vigorous
enforcement, some proponents would view it as worthwhile for that reason
alone.
The results presented above do not permit us to separate the effects of
enforcement and of amnesty —-indeed,we cannot unequivocally attribute the
observed effects to the combination of enforcement and amnestyprograms. But,
particularly in states with programs that attracted a higher fraction of state
tax revenues in amnesty payments, the combined enforcement and amnesty
activities tended to be prominent features of the fiscal landscape in theyear
of amnesty.It seems likely that there is a meaningful relationship between
the shifts we observed in state tax revenue growth rates and the launching of
dramatic new enforcement efforts and tax amnesty programs. And in states with
programs perceived as successful, virtually all participants seem to believe
that the combination of enhanced enforcement and amnesty worked a special form
of magic.
Suppose, then, that we believe (on the basis of IRS and 0MB figures) that
there is room to enhance federal enforcement and that we do not wish to
separate out the independent effect of amnesty; rather, we want to consider
how much the federal government might obtain through a combined
enforcement/amnesty program. What might the state experience tell us about
the prospects for such a program?
The most obvious problem in applying the state experience at the federal
level is that the two tax bases have quite different compositions. Many state
amnesty programs seem to have been particularly attractive to sales tax
delinquents; the virtual absence of excise taxes at the federal level limits-26-
the relevance of this part of the state experience. Even if we confine our
attention to income taxes, however, state amnesties collected considerable
delinquent revenue. Table 4 shows the amnesty collections and the income
tax-related portion for the four largest amnesty programs (data on Michigan,
the last amnesty program to close, were not available. Amnesty income tax
collections as a fraction of annual income tax revenues ranged from just under
1 percent to a bit over 3 percent, with a weighted average of about 2 percent.
Since total amnesty collections in these states averaged less than 2 percent
of total revenues, income tax collections actually represented a larger
proportion of amnesty payments than of tax payments overall.22 There is no
obvious reason to believe that federal revenues are less subject to
amnestiable delinquency than state revenues --atleast, not by,virtue of
their composition across taxes.
A second problem is that the state data provide no direct evidence about
how many federal tax delinquents would take advantage of an amnesty. There
are many ways to cheat on state taxes and still stay within bounds on federal
tax impositions. An obvious example is the taxpayer who files federal forms
accurately but falsely claims residence in a low-tax state. He or she has
much to tell the state tax collector but nothing to confess to a federal tax
examiner. In fact, many of the payments collected by state programs were of
this general form. Lerman's review of three state amnesties found that well
over 90 percent of those who took advantage of the programs had already filed
federal forms.23 By contrast, about 60 percent of those taking advantage of
Massachusetts' amnesty had not filed with the state. Only 1 percent were
amending previously filed state forms.24 A second example is people who had—27—
already been caught by federal auditors. They knew that the exchange of
information between the IRS and state tax collectors would eventually catch up
with them; many of them took advantage of the state amnesties as well.
This interaction of federal and state tax codes, enforcement, and evasion
cuts in both directions. How shall we interpret the fact that most of the
state amnesty filers were already in compliance on their federal taxes? If it
indicates that enforcement is much better at the federal level, so that
taxpayers have cheated more on state than on federal taxes, then a federal
amnesty will raise less revenue than the state experience would suggest.
However, an alternative interpretation might be that state programs, which
were offered without federal participation, were spurned by a large group of
noncomplying taxpayers who cheat on both federal and state taxes.
Consider the situation of a taxpayer who has failed to report $2000 of
income on which he or she would have to pay a 5 percent state tax and a 42
percent federal tax. The state offers an amnesty enabling the delinquent to
settle up for a small tax payment (and interest). But it is well known that
information on amnesty filers will be made available to the IRS. Thus taking
advantage of the state amnesty will result in a much larger tax, interest, and
penalty liability at the federal level --withno relief on the penalty part.
This cannot have seemed a very attractive bargain.It is no wonder that the
overwhelming majority of taxpayers who took advantage of the state programs
were those already paying their federal taxes (or those coming forward to pay
state levies such as sales tax, where there was no accompanying federal
charge).
This argument suggests that state programs, however successful, tapped-28—
only a portion of the state delinquencies --thosethat did not also involve a
federal delinquency. For this reason, estimating federal amnesty revenue on
the basis of state experience systematically underestimates the federal
revenue potential. The more that evaded state taxes are associated with
evaded federal taxes, the greater the underestimate is likely to be.
On net, we suspect, these arguments suggest that the state experience
will underestimate the potential of a federal tax amnesty. To besure, most
of those who participated in the state programs were not federal tax
delinquents, at least not on these monies. However, federal penalties create
strong incentives for federal delinquents not to show up at state amnesty
offices. Their absence in the data testifies to their presence of mind.
If extrapolating from the state experience provides an underestimate,
then an effective enforcement and amnesty program at the federal level could
yield quite substantial revenue. The one—time collection -—ifgreater than 1.5
percent of income tax revenues, as the collections in the four largest state
programs were --wouldbe on the order of $10 billion. If the growth in federal
revenues responds as state tax revenues apparently have, an additional
increase of 1 or 2 percent of annual revenues, and conceivably muchmore, may
be achievable, producing a continuing flow on the order of $10 billionper
year. It is true that we might get much of these increases through stiffened
enforcement alone, but without an amnesty, a radical change in enforcement
procedures seems unlikely.25
This estimate of the potential revenue from a combined federalamnesty
and enforcement program does not seem unreasonable in light of the amount and
composition of federal tax noncompliance. In a widely cited report on tax—29—
compliance published in 1983, the IRS estimated that approximately $90 billion
in income taxes went unpaid in 1981.26 As Lerman observes, inflation would
raise this total, while the reductions in income tax rates and more effective
records-matching and other enforcement would reduce it; it seems reasonable to
guess that noncompliance is of the same order of magnitude today. A portion
of nonpayment —-forexample, the $9 billion in unpaid taxes on the profits
from illegal activity —-isunlikely to be susceptible to either amnesty or
enforcement (or both). A substantial component, however1 estimated at about
$70 billion in 1981, is from underreporting of income and overstatement of
deductions on submitted tax returns. Some of the large accumulated store of
such unacknowledged tax debts might well be susceptible to a well-managed
federal amnesty combined with vigorous new enforcement. An additional $3
billion annually is due from tax returns that were never filed. This form of
evasion was a particularly fruitful source of payments during state amnesties.
While the federal situation for nonfilers is clearly somewhat different
(because federal taxpayers cannot claim that they are filing in another
jurisdiction, and therefore that they are not subject to federal taxes), this
might still be a source of considerable revenue under a federal
amnesty/enforcement package •27
Our estimates of the potential revenues cover a wide range; they are
subject to considerable doubt. The state experience is difficult to read by
itself, and it fits the federal situation only loosely. But if these figures
are of the right order of magnitude, they strongly suggest that a combined
enforcement and amnesty program at the federal level is well worth careful
consideration. They also indicate that a federal program is likely to be more-30—
--probablymuch more —-effectiveif combined with state amnesties.
We argued that the absence of a federal amnesty effectively blocked many
taxpayers' access to state amnesty programs, reducing those programs'
effectiveness. The problem is less severe in reverse, because state penalties
and taxes due are generally much smaller than the federal liability an amnesty
filer would voluntarily be accepting. Still, it may be harder to admit
"error" when one jurisdiction is forgiving but another calls you a tax evader
(and penalizes you accordingly). There is no obvious reason why states could
not be encouraged to facilitate their citizens' access to the federal amnesty
by granting a coordinated umbrella amnesty program. (Indeed, Nebraska has
already authorized a contingent amnesty program, to take effect only in
concert with a federal amnesty.) To discourage free-riding states the federal
government might conceivably share information about taxpayers filing under
the amnesty program only with states that are participating, or might offer
amnesty only in conjunction with a state. Citizen ire might well force states
to comply. It a few states held out, the program would not be spoiled, though
revenues would be reduced.
Just how a federal program would work --whetherstates would coordinate
with it, how many taxpayers might accept the offer, what impact it would have
on future compliance --remainsin considerable doubt. It seems clear,
however, that the upside potential for revenue gains is considerable.28—31—
1.Explicit Amnesties Within Implicit Amnesties: What IsReally Different?
Society's preference for obtaining confessions rather than convictions
generally leads it to offer lower penalties for those who voluntarily admit
wrongdoing. There are both moral and strategic reasons for thisapproach.
Thus, an explicit amnesty may be simply a more extreme or betterpublicized
form of a general policy of (partial) forgiveness for thecontrite confessed
offender. So it is with tax amnesty programs, whichgenerally waive criminal
and civil penalties (at least for those who do notalready know they are under
investigation). But the open secret is that in virtually all jurisdictions
criminal penalties and many civil penalties are routinely waived forthose who
voluntarily disclose and agree to pay tax delinquencies. Except for the most
flagrant tax evasions, the outcome of an investigation is some form of
confession of error or miscalculation by the delinquent, combined withpayment
of the back taxes and interest, sometimes including latepayment or
failure—to-file penalties.
The penalties are low to start with —-atthe federal level, a maximum of
25 percent of tax liability for late payment and an additional 5percent for
negligence. But even these penalties may be abated in cases withextenuating
circumstances, which means in practice that they are sometimes negotiated in
return for resolution by agreement rather than through litigation -—thatis,
in return for some form of confession. Both state revenuedepartments and the
IRS abate many of the penalties they assess in the ordinary course of their
business; last year the IRS waived nearly 40 percent of the penalties its
rules imposed, letting over 4 million taxpayers off the hook fornearly $2—32—
billion in penalties. Since 1978, the IRS has provided abatements to nearly
20 million taxpayers. Commenting on the IRS's practices, Ira Jackson,
commissioner of revenue in Massachusetts, observed, "Amnesty merely offers on
a wholesale basis what tax partners in big eight accounting firms and every
well-informed tax lawyer routinely obtain for their clients on a retail
basis ,"29
This assessment, accountants tell us, may somewhat overstate the case.
Most penalties are not abated, though some questionable penalties are waived
swiftly as part of deals. Nevertheless, the offer of amnesty bears important
similarities to what is generally available to delinquents who come forth
voluntarily. Amnesty differs in four ways;(1) the (relatively small)
difference in the terms available, (2) publicity, (3) its importance as an
element of a political compromise and as a signaling mechanism fostering a
change to a new regime of stricter enforcement, and (4) its inclusion of
elements of pardon and redemption.
Which of these features account for the dramatic amnesty collections of
the successful states? Surely not the first ——asmall change in the terms of
the deal cannot explain such a sudden influx to the confessional. The second
and third factors are related, for the effect of amnesties seems to lie mainly
in the fact that they are publicized (and therefore draw in many more
delinquents) and that they permit the curtain to be raised on a new
enforcement regime. (The fourth factor is best assessed by psychologists and
theologians, not the economist authors.)
While any policy of negotiated penalties creates equity problems —-some
know the penalty structure and others do not, and some have better negotiators—33—
-—ithas the virtue of permitting differentiationamong violators. Whatever
our reasons for giving amnesty, we are presumably more inclined togive it for
some offenses than for others. There is no reason why anamnesty need be a
blanket forgiveness, and state programs havegenerally not been.
Amnesties could be selectively defined. If we want toforgive only small
errors, a ceiling can be set.If we think the reporting of some forms of
income is more subject to error, and others more to abuse,we may selectively
permit amnesty tor errors in the types of income less often abused. An
amnesty can be selective in the kinds of filers it excuses, the kinds of
errors -ft forgives, the period it covers, and so on. The startingpoint need
not be taxes filed before today; two years from now, the federalgovernment
could initiate a selective amnesty that would cover allfilings under the
"old' tax code but none under the new code. A well-designed selectiveprogram
could retain much of the benefit of a broader, wholesale clearing of theslate
accompanied by stiff penalties for those who do not take advantage of
society's "generous offer." An amnesty/enforcement package allows society to
ask the repentant sheep to step aside from the incorrigiblegoats --andit
comes with a strong message that the remaining goats will be pursued.Many
erstwhile goats may be induced to convert voluntarily to sheephood.
8. Conclusion
Whatever its ultimate effects, an amnesty may seem to represent a
relaxation of tax enforcement efforts. Some observers are concerned that such
a program would unacceptably undercut the legitimacy of our tax code and of—:34—
our laws generally. Most citizens seem to pay their taxes primarily as a
matter of conscience. If tax amnesties diminish the force of conscience,
spreading the message that tax evasion is commonplace and easily forgiven,
they may diminish compliance and force society to raise taxes and rely more
heavily on less efficient enforcement mechanisms. This is a serious potential
liability, which leads to a political prediction: should there be a federal
amnesty, it will, like the prominent state amnesties, be linked with a
vigorous new enforcement effort. This coupling would reinforce the virtues of
strict enforcement. Any punished individuals would have rejected the
opportunity to come forth. They could no longer be thought of merely as tax
shavers --theywould have voluntarily chosen, in the face of a generous offer
of reconciliation, to remain tax cheaters.
The loss of conscience should not be a problem in a well-orchestrated
enforcement and tax amnesty program. Publicized seizures, arrests,
prosecutions, fines, audits, and notices signal that tax evasion has
unfortunate consequences, that it is being taken more seriously, that those
who do not comply will be an increasingly small and besieged minority.
Amnesty is a way out before the trap springs shut. The penalty scale is
twisted, not reduced. Evasion is made no less a crime.
An amnesty may provide a socially valuable opportunity to set things
straight, to move to a more desirable equilibrium with more widespread honest
citizenship and greater punishment of violators ——thatis, with sharper
differentiation between those observing and those outside the social compact.
Though it is conceivable that a strict enforcement program might be
enacted by itself, the inclusion of an amnesty would offer four advantages.-35—
First, merely considering the subject would give the issue new prominence,
define it in new terms, get it on the policy agenda, and link it to the
tax reform. Second, it might help strike a political balance, and foster
innovation by making the new outcome appear to be less of a departure from the
status quo. Third, the amnesty would represent a way to provide identifiable
funds needed for an additional enforcement effort.3° Fourth, inconjunction
with the enforcement program, the amnesty would reconfigure the taxpenalty
schedule in a manner that would probably increase revenues both in the short
run (because of the incentives to pay up) and in the long run (because paying
old debts reduces future costs of compliance).
Our view of the world is summarized in the figure on the nextpage. If
these political prognostications are accepted, the relevant comparison when
considering an amnesty will be between boxes A and 0, the status quo and a new
regime offering an amnesty coupled with future strict enforcement.
Our review suggests that an effectively managed federal tax amnesty
program, in combination with an advertised enhancement of enforcement, might
potentially raise significant revenue, perhaps on the order of $10 billion,
with continuing substantial revenue gains, albeit of highly uncertain
magnitude. Although there are no guarantees such a program will work, the
crude estimates of potential gains are large enough to warrant a full-fledged
consideration of an amnesty program. And since each enforcement dollar yields
many dollars in revenue, quite apart from its effects on nurturing compliance,
if the discussion of amnesty merely pushes enforcement issues into
Congressional debate, it will certainly have been worthwhile.—36—
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1. In Biblical times, some were even regularly scheduled. The Old Testament
refers to Jubilee years, at half—century intervals, in which debtor slaves
were to be treed and "alienated property" was to be returned to its rightful
owner. See Leviticus 25:6-34.
2. In some cases --parkingtickets and library fines may be examples -—our
inability to enforce rules has led to an undesirable equilibrium involving
little compliance, little revenue, and many offenders outside the social
contract. Better enforcement technology --forexample, computerized
record-keeping or the Denver Boot —-mayimprove the ongoing equilibrium,
reducing the need for amnesties.
3.One suspects, however, that those with draft lottery numbers just ahead
of the cutoff, who would have escaped being drafted had there been fewer evaders,
might have been more likely than others to oppose the draft evasion amnesty.
4. It is often difficult to distinguish profitable and realistically
refinanced loans from refinancing designed to conceal bad debts. The Small
Business Administration has often been accused of using rollovers to keep down—37—
the reported rate of default, and some of thearrangements offering new credit
to developing countries that are overextended appear to be of this form.An
official amnesty may provide a way to terminate such undesirable behavior.
Indeed, amnesties that will officially waive or reduce some debtrepayment by
developing countries have been widely discussed, because it seems likely that
full-value repayments will never be made.
5. Indeed, some people oppose a tax amnesty because it would seem to make
evasion less of a crime. No doubt such thinking underlies the nearly
universal agreement that any tax amnesty would have to be backedby a much
more rigorous enforcement effort. Whereas the immigration amnesty is expected
to decrease the scale of the enforcement problem dramatically, no oneexpects
tax amnesties to reduce evasion enough to permit a substantial relaxation of
enforcement. More enforcement in the tax area will simply require more
resources devoted to this task.
6. The seemingly accidental and arbitrary enforcement of the Georgia law
prohibiting sodomy, recently affirmed by the Supreme Court, struck many
observers this way. The Court affirmed the state's right to prohibit sexual
behavior it regards as illicit even if conducted by consenting adults in their
homes, but it did not comment on the differential enforcement issue. That is,
no one raised the issue of the constitutionality of enforcing a law that is
generally so casually enforced that apprehension would almost necessarily be
accidental.
7.Both privately and publicly, we generally avoid the apparent unfairness
that comes from changing our implicit contracts about enforcement. As our
children grow older and more responsible, we do not enforce rules—38--
-
retroactivelyeven if they were aware of them. We declare that prior
violations are exempt -—amnestied——butthat in the future punishment will
be consistent and more severe. The principle of not subjecting people to
punishment more severe than what they can reasonably be said to have risked
when they committed the offense is embodied in our norms for parental
behavior, our common law, and our constitutional prohibition against ex post
facto laws.
8.Other amnesties are also predictable. No victorious army in modern times
has sought permanently to enslave the defeated population (though that was a
common practice for thousands of years). In this instance, of course, the
incentive effect operates in the opposite direction. Knowing that it will not
be enslaved, the enemy may not fight so hard.
9. The fact that amnesties yield present benefits and future costs sets up a
political incentive structure that may produce too many amnesties as
administrations with limited lifespans hasten to collect the benefits, while
leaving many of the costs to their successors.
10. Western justice, perhaps still in the (no more than an) eye—for-an—eye
tradition, has rarely incorporated probability of detection as a significant
factor in setting penalties. Partly for this reason, no doubt, penalties for
tax noncompliance are quite low. The charge for late payment is 5 percent of
tax due per month up to a maximum of 25 percent. The penalty for negligence
is only an additional 5 percent of the tax due, Clearly our present scale of
penalties is not designed for our present situation, where the probability of
an audit is less than 1 percent, and even then an offense may not be provable
or even identified.—39—
11. Undoubtedly there are even what economists callexternalities --guilt
and legitimacy effects felt beyond the specificarena of the amnesty. Indeed,
this may be a critical argument against anamnesty for past toxic waste
dumping, despite the health gains it might offer by making futuredumping less
likely. The legitimacy of all society's rules would be diminished ifwe
announced that people who have risked the public healthmay get off scot-free.
Similarly, when we excuse past tax evaders, violators of all laws look a
little less disreputable, though the externality wouldseem to be less severe.
12. We want tax evasion to have the moral connotation ofstealing in contrast
to offenses like illegal parking, for which hardly anyone sufferspangs of
conscience. (A decision not to feed the meter seems merely a smallwager with
the parking department, of no consequence beyond themoney involved.)
13. In theory individuals would multiply what they owe if caughtby the
probability of getting caught and choose amnesty only if they save money on
average. But several kinds of conditions will make an amnesty in conjunction
with a bolstered enforcement effort likely to collect morerevenues than the
enforcement effort alone: (1) Individuals miscalculate or fail to calculate;
the publicity accompanying the amnesty may encourage them toparticipate.
(2) Individuals are risk averse on the magnitude of fines.(3) There are
nonconservative penalties such as shame or jail.(4) Amnesty allows for
legitimate repentance and an escape from unfavorable self-perception.
(5} Amnesty induces enough discoverable delinquents to come forward that the
population of remaining delinquents is reduced and their probability of
discovery is increased. (6) Those who participate in an amnesty may provide
information that implicates other evaders, thus changing the probability of-40-
detection.
14. Such massive gains may not be repeated. Given higher voluntary
compliance, presumably the backlog of assessable delinquent taxes will shrink
in the future.
15. The slower growth of revenues in these states may have created
particularly severe pressure to find new revenues or improve their tax
compliance.
16. Proceeding state by state, we first measured the difference between each
state's growth in revenues and the national average growth for the preamnesty
period. Using 1983 observed revenues, we then projected 1984 revenues in the
absence of amnesty by assuming that the state's revenue growth rate would have
continued to differ from the national average by the same amount as in the
preamnesty period. We then compared the estimated revenues without amnesty to
the revenues actually observed with the amnesty programs in place. This
amounts to fitting a fixed-effects model for state revenue growth rates, with
each state permitted to have growth differing from the national average and to
have its own "amnesty" effect. In particular, it assumes no regression toward
the mean. We place little reliance on the individual state results,
preferring instead to examine the aggregated results.
l7. We obtain a range of estimates because there are various plausible ways
to estimate revenues in the amnesty states under the hypothetical scenario
"without amnesty." Using different base periods to measure state
differentials from the national average, projecting 1985 revenues one year
forward from 1984 rather than two years forward from 1983, and other small
changes in assumptions result in minor variations in the results. We are—41—
certain that other approaches to making these projections would lead to
different results and that alternative explanations havingnothing to do with
amnesty could be advanced. Nonetheless, our results do not seem implausible,
and they are robust against small variations in the assumptionsunderlying the
calculations presented here.
18. This counts revenues and tax amnesty gains for 1984 for the 1984amnesty
states only; revenues and gains for 1985 are counted for both 1984 and 1985
amnesty states.
19. Allen H. Lerman, "Tax Amnesty: The Federal Perspective," National Tax
Journal, Vol. 39, No. 3, pp. 325-332, 1986.
20. See, for example, Frank Malanga, "The Relationship Between IRS
Enforcement and Tax Yield," National Tax Journal, Vol. 39, No. 3,pp. 333—337,
1986.
21. To maximize net revenues raised, enforcement would be pushed until the
last dollar yielded a dollar of revenue, since taxes paid are a transfer,
whereas enforcement expenditures represent real resource costs. The
efficiency argument for greater enforcement is that it leads to lower overall
tax rates, thus reducing adverse consequences for incentives. Many critics,
of course, are more interested in the equity effects of enforcement, its
ability to distribute more equally the tax burden imposed on individuals
with similar incomes.
22. This fact is most startling when we consider that virtually all income
taxed by the states is taxed by the federal government as well, and that there
is a matching program for tax compliance between the two levels.
23. Lerman, .cit.,at fn 3.—42—
24. Massachusetts Department of Revenue, "The Massachusetts Amnesty Program:
A Statistical Synopsis," Mimeo: June 1986. The remaining 39 percent took
advantage of amnesty to pay debts already on tax collectors' books as accounts
receivable without penalties.
25. Indeed, some would argue the trend at the federal level has been in the
other direction. The proportion of taxpayers now audited is less than half
what it was 20 years ago. The IRS argues that the lower audit rate is more
than offset through better targeting, electronic record matching, and other
more effective modern information-processing approaches.
26. U.S. Oepartment of Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, Income Tax
Compliance Research: Estimates for 1973—1981, Washington, D.C.: July 1983.
27. Lerman presents a similar argument. Since he concentrates on amnesty
alone, however, his analysis answers a different question about the amount of
revenue to be gained from underreporting and overdeducting on previously filed
forms. He argues that amnesty alone will do little to bring forward those who
have consciously evaded their liabilities. Since we are analyzing a combined
package of tougher enforcement and amnesty, the $70 billion of "ordinary"
tax-shaving is a potentially considerable source of revenue. See Lerman, .
cit.,pp. 329—331.
28. Several steps could be taken to make amnesties more likely to work. Many
forms of tax evasion involve more than one person; society might want to
advertise that if you have ever colluded to avoid taxes you had better take
advantage of amnesty because your partners might do so, and we will chase down
others involved in schemes that come to light under amnesty. Even snitching
could be given greater rewards.-43-.
29. Ira Jackson, speech to National FaxAssociation --TaxInstitute of
America, May 19, 1986, p. 11. Jackson discussesthe figures cited above on
the frequency with which the IRS abatespenalties.
30. The IRS has not been run as aprofit center and does not directly retain
any of the revenue it collects. Tax reform proposals included
a provision to
permit the IRS to keep a fraction of its enforcementcollections, but the
spectre of IRS agents overeager to collect fromhapless taxpayers led to the
rejection of this idea.-44-
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